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Essay 
Labor Law After Legalization 
Michael J. Wishnie† 
The most important labor or employment law reform in a 
generation came within a few votes of enactment last spring. 
With due respect to the Employee Free Choice Act of 2007,1 
which would have enacted numerous pro-worker amendments 
to the National Labor Relations Act,2 I refer to the Comprehen-
sive Immigration Reform Act of 2007,3 a bill that the Bush ad-
ministration and a bipartisan group of legislators negotiated in 
spring 2007,4 but that the Senate ultimately failed to pass.5  
The compromise immigration legislation was lengthy, but 
at its center were three elements: (1) a legalization program for 
many of the estimated twelve million undocumented immi-
grants in the United States;6 (2) expansion of various forms of 
temporary worker programs to accommodate future arrivals;7 
 
†  Clinical Professor of Law, Yale Law School and member of the Labor 
Law Group. Copyright © 2008 by Michael J. Wishnie. 
 1. H.R. 800, 110th Cong. (as passed by House of Representatives, Mar. 1, 
2007); S. 1041, 110th Cong. (2007). The Senate vote to invoke cloture failed on 
June 26, 2007. See 153 CONG. REC. S8398 (daily ed. June 26, 2007). 
 2. See H.R. 800; S. 1041; see also National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 151–169 (2000).  
 3. S. 1348, 110th Cong. (as introduced in Senate, May 9, 2007). 
 4. See Immigration Bill Dies in the Senate, CHI. TRIB., June 29, 2007, at 
18 (describing the bipartisan nature of the bill and President Bush’s support 
for it). 
 5. See S. 1348 (reflecting the original bill as introduced in the Senate). A 
cloture vote on the original bill failed to pass on June 7, 2007. 153 CONG. REC. 
S7279 (daily ed. June 7, 2007). A compromise bill, S. 1639, 110th Cong. (2007), 
was reintroduced on June 18, 2007. See also 153 CONG. REC. S8528 (daily ed. 
June 27, 2007) (statement of Sen. Feinstein). A few senators filibustered the 
reintroduced bill when it was taken up on June 27, 2007. See id. at S8642–43 
(daily ed. June 28, 2007) (statement of Sen. Specter) (discussing the use of Se-
nate procedure by some senators to kill the bill); see also id. at S8526 (daily ed. 
June 27, 2007). A cloture vote to end the filibuster failed on June 28, 2007. Id. 
at S8650–51 (daily ed. June 28, 2007). 
 6. S. 1639, §§ 601–627 (defining the proposed legalization program). 
 7. Id. §§ 401–427 (reflecting the proposed temporary worker programs). 
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and (3) increased immigration law enforcement, including en-
hanced border security measures, expanded penalties for em-
ployers who knowingly hire or employ unauthorized workers, 
and an intensified system of employer online verification of the 
work-authorization status of all employees.8 The terms of the 
legalization program were contested,9 and varying views on the 
desirability, size, and scope of new temporary-worker programs 
remained.10 Yet under any of the serious proposals then dis-
cussed, millions of undocumented workers would have become 
eligible to regularize their status, and hundreds of thousands of 
new temporary workers could have lived and worked lawfully 
in the United States. 
Immigration reform may reasonably be characterized as 
the most significant labor reform in a generation.11 The pro-
posed legislation would have given millions of undocumented 
workers more robust labor and employment rights.12 These 
 
 8. Id. §§ 101–150 (outlining the proposed border security measures); id. 
§§ 201–229 (delineating the proposed increase in interior enforcement and pe-
nalties); id. §§ 301–310 (reflecting the proposed worksite enforcement, online 
verification amendments, and penalties). 
 9. The disputes included whether prior use of false papers would bar le-
galization, see 153 CONG. REC. S7113–14 (daily ed. June 6, 2007) (statement of 
Sen. Kennedy) (discussing the effect of a proposed amendment and false pa-
pers), whether persons would have to return to their country of origin to 
“touchback” before lawfully reentering the United States, see id. at S6601 (dai-
ly ed. May 24, 2007) (statement of Sen. Lincoln), and the length of time per-
sons would have had to reside in the United States to become eligible for lega-
lization, see id. at S7288–89 (daily ed. June 7, 2007) (statement of Sen. Webb). 
 10. See id. at S6941 (daily ed. May 25, 2007) (statement of Sen. Sessions) 
(discussing the duration of time persons would have to spend in temporary 
lawful status before becoming eligible to apply for permanent residence). 
 11. For instance, we know from experience with the Immigration Reform 
and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.), that wages rose significantly for 
newly legalized workers. See Sherrie A. Kossoudji & Deborah A. Cobb-Clark, 
Coming out of the Shadows: Learning About Legal Status and Wages from the 
Legalized Population, 20 J. LAB. ECON. 598, 622 (2002) (“Although they are 
not definitive, our results provide strong evidence that IRCA’s amnesty provi-
sions improved the labor market opportunities for legalized workers.”); Fran-
cisco L. Rivera-Batiz, Undocumented Workers in the Labor Market: An Analy-
sis of the Earnings of Legal and Illegal Mexican Immigrants in the United 
States, 12 J. POPULATION ECON. 91, 93 (1999) (noting the wage penalty attri-
butable to lack of immigration status). 
 12. Cf. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 140 
(2002) (holding that an undocumented worker who tendered false documents 
and was illegally fired for union organizing activity was not eligible for back 
pay under the National Labor Relations Act); Catherine L. Fisk & Michael J. 
Wishnie, The Story of Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: Labor 
Rights Without Remedies for Undocumented Immigrants, in LABOR LAW STO-
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workers would have also been able to assert the limited 
workplace rights they already had, even as undocumented 
workers,13 with a vastly diminished risk of deportation.14 Mil-
lions more U.S. workers also would have benefited from the in-
creased protections arising from the enforcement of workplace 
rights by noncitizen workers. 
These improvements were not realized in 2007. Neverthe-
less, the economic, political, security, and human imperatives 
fueling the effort to modernize our antiquated immigration sys-
tem with twenty-first century market and migration realities 
make it likely that Congress will soon return to immigration 
legislation. Business demands for a more stable, reliable work-
force in which it can sensibly invest continue. The post-
September 11 security environment, as well as the everyday 
community-policing needs, require measures to promote police-
civilian cooperation involving all residents of the country, re-
gardless of immigration status.15 The bipartisan competition 
for new Latino voters remains an electoral priority. And most of 
all, the moral claims of millions of immigrant households and 
the undeniable human reality of global migration, with its 
wide-ranging social impacts, together compel reform. The broad 
public consensus in favor of a legislative package that includes 
legalization, expanded temporary-worker programs, and in-
creased enforcement makes ultimate passage likely.16 
 
RIES 399, 399–400 (Laura J. Cooper & Catherine L. Fisk eds., 2005) (discuss-
ing the comparatively weak legal rights of undocumented workers). 
 13. See, e.g., Zeng Liu v. Donna Karan Int’l, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 191, 
191–93 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that a worker may recover unpaid minimum 
wages and overtime for work actually performed, regardless of immigration 
status); Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 845 N.E.2d 1246, 1260 (N.Y. 2006) 
(holding that where an employer failed to verify an employee’s work authori-
zation, and the employee did not tender false documents, the undocumented 
worker was eligible for compensation under the state Scaffolding Law). 
 14. Cf. Rivera v. Nibco, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1064 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting 
that fear of deportation deters noncitizens from enforcing labor and employ-
ment rights they possess); Michael J. Wishnie, Immigrants and the Right to 
Petition, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 667, 669–70 (2003) (same). 
 15. See, e.g., Int’l Ass’n of Chiefs of Police, Enforcing Immigration Law: 
The Role of State, Tribal and Local Law Enforcement 5 (2004) http:// 
www.theiacp.org/documents/pdfs/Publications/ImmigrationEnforcementconf%
2Epdf. 
 16. See, e.g., NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM, WHILE DEBATE RAGES, THE 
PUBLIC CONTINUES TO SUPPORT REALISTIC IMMIGRATION REFORM 1–7 (2007), 
http://www.immigrationforum.org/documents/PressRoom/PublicOpinion/2007/
PollingSummary0407.pdf. 
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In this Essay, I wish to consider the shape of labor and 
employment law after congressional enactment of comprehen-
sive immigration reform. In particular, I hope to identify the 
issues likely to be of greatest importance to low-wage immi-
grant workers in an era of legalization and expanded tempo-
rary worker programs. For this purpose, I will assume that 
Congress does in fact enact a legalization program that permits 
many, but not all, undocumented immigrants to participate; 
that expands temporary worker programs; and that mandates 
intensified immigration enforcement at the border, in the crim-
inal justice system, in communities, and especially in the 
workplace. 
This exercise is important for at least two reasons. First, it 
may illuminate, from a labor perspective, some of the shortcom-
ings of the leading immigration reform proposals. An unin-
tended benefit of the failure of immigration reform in 2006 and 
2007 is the opportunity for the labor movement to find its voice 
and correct these deficiencies by introducing important pro-
worker improvements in whatever legislation is ultimately 
enacted.17 There also remains an opening for labor economists, 
advocates, law professors, and other academics and practition-
ers to contribute their expertise to the legislative discussion in 
a more serious and sustained manner. Second, regardless of the 
details of the final package, low-wage workers and their advo-
cates have an interest in imagining the world we will soon in-
habit, so as to prepare to seize new opportunities to promote 
labor organizing, and to address new dangers that may arise. 
I.  LABOR LAW AFTER LEGALIZATION   
Broadly speaking, there will be three distinct categories of 
low-wage immigrant workers in the United States after Con-
gress enacts an immigration reform package such as I have 
outlined: (1) workers eligible to apply for legalization, (2) work-
 
 17. Internal divisions within the labor movement have decreased its effec-
tiveness in the immigration debate. Compare AFL-CIO Executive Council 
Statement, Responsible Reform of Immigration Laws Must Protect Working 
Conditions for All Workers in the U.S. (Mar. 1, 2006), available at http://www 
.calaborfed.org/pdfs/Legislative/AFL%20immpol.pdf (opposing the expansion of 
temporary-worker programs), with Letter from Anna Burger, Chair, Change to 
Win, to Sen. Arlen Specter, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Comm. (Feb. 2, 2006), 
available at http://www.changetowin.org/for-the-media/op-eds-articles-and 
-speeches/immigration-letter-from-anna-burger-to-arlen-specter.html (recog-
nizing a potential role for temporary-worker programs in a comprehensive 
reform package and urging specific terms). 
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ers participating in a temporary worker program, and (3) undo-
cumented workers who are ineligible to legalize.18 I will briefly 
consider the principal elements of the mainstream legislative 
proposals relating to each of these three groups of workers, and 
then offer some initial thoughts on the most important labor 
and employment issues that each group of workers will con-
front post-legalization. 
A. LEGALIZATION OF UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS 
There are approximately twelve million undocumented 
persons in the United States today,19 a total that may be grow-
ing by a net annual increase exceeding five hundred thousand 
persons.20 The undocumented participate in the labor force at 
high rates,21 accounting for over seven million workers nation-
ally, concentrated in low-skill positions.22 Nearly all public offi-
cials, including the President and congressional leaders, ac-
knowledge that no government program can or should arrest, 
detain, and deport these millions of people. Many undocu-
mented immigrants have resided in this country for years while 
working, raising families, and serving as positive and produc-
tive members of society. Yet the presence of this enormous 
population living in the shadows, unable fully to participate in 
the economic, civic, religious, cultural, and political life of their 
communities, creates substantial social and fiscal costs, and 
 
 18. There has been almost no public discussion whatsoever of the situa-
tion of undocumented workers after comprehensive immigration reform. This 
is understandable in political terms—proponents of reform must present any 
legislation as substantially addressing the current failures of our immigration 
system, and may not want to highlight the problems that will inevitably re-
main even were Congress to pass broad reforms. 
 19. JEFFREY S. PASSELL, THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNAU-
THORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S., at i (Pew Hispanic Ctr. ed., 
2006), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/61.pdf (estimating that 
the size of the unauthorized population in the United States stood between 
11.5 and 12 million people in March 2006). 
 20. Id. at 2. Between 2000 and 2005, approximately 850,000 persons en-
tered the United States unlawfully or overstayed a visa each year; but several 
hundred thousand died, departed, or regularized their status each year, yield-
ing a net increase in the undocumented population of approximately 500,000 
persons annually. Id. at 2–3; see also Jennifer Van Hook et al., Unauthorized 
Migrants Living in the United States: A Mid-Decade Portrait, MIGRATION IN-
FO. SOURCE, Sept. 2005, http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/ 
display.cfm?id=329 (estimating that between 2000 and 2004, two hundred 
thousand to three hundred thousand undocumented immigrants annually 
“leave the United States, die, or become legal immigrants”). 
 21. PASSELL, supra note 19, at 9–14. 
 22. Id. at 10–14. 
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challenges our nation’s basic commitment to a caste-free socie-
ty. To address these intolerable conditions, the 2006–2007 bi-
partisan reform proposals contained legalization programs that 
would have allowed many of the current undocumented popula-
tion to regularize their immigration status.23 
At present, undocumented workers possess fewer labor and 
employment rights than U.S. workers, and face greater difficul-
ties in asserting those rights they do retain.24 From a labor 
rights perspective, therefore, securing the broadest feasible le-
galization program is critical to advancing the labor rights of 
these millions of workers.25 The more workers allowed to regu-
larize their status, the greater the expansion of labor rights; in 
contrast, the greater the number of workers excluded from any 
such program, the smaller the number of workers fully able to 
protect themselves in the workplace.  
Accordingly, a pro-worker legalization program should in-
clude as few barriers to participation as feasible, consistent 
with the integrity of the program. Any legalization fees, for in-
stance, should be affordable, and the timelines for progressing 
from temporary status to lawful permanent residence, and from 
there to citizenship, should be reasonable.26 The legalization 
program should not include onerous or unrealistic eligibility 
criteria, such as the requirement proposed by some that all le-
galization applicants depart the country to “touch base” before 
lawfully reentering.27 Exclusions of those who have ever 
worked under a false name or social security number must be 
rejected as well, along with other blanket exclusions.28 Apart 
 
 23. See, e.g., To Provide for Comprehensive Immigration Reform and for 
Other Purposes, S. 1639, 110th Cong. tit. VI (2007). 
 24. See Fisk & Wishnie, supra note 12. 
 25. Cf. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 151 
(2002) (holding that the NLRB may not award back pay to illegal aliens be-
cause it “would unduly trench upon explicit statutory prohibitions critical to 
federal immigration policy”); Julie A. Phillips et al., The New Labor Market: 
Immigrants and Wages After IRCA, 36 DEMOGRAPHY 233, 244 (1999) (finding 
that immigration status is associated with a significant wage penalty); Rivera-
Batiz, supra note 11, at 93 (concluding that undocumented status results in a 
wage penalty). 
 26. Legal permanent residents have long been eligible to apply for natura-
lization after five years as permanent residents. See 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2000). 
 27. See supra note 9 (noting “touchback” proposals). 
 28. Two potential exclusions of special significance are those of persons 
with criminal history or an outstanding removal order. See S. 1639, 
§ 601(d)(1)(B) (excluding any person “subject to the execution of an outstand-
ing administratively final order of removal, deportation, or exclusion”); id. 
§ 601(d)(1)(E), (F) (excluding persons convicted of certain criminal offenses). 
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from resisting efforts to narrow any legalization program, the 
labor movement also has an interest in insisting on capacious 
eligibility criteria, particularly regarding minimum residency 
requirements.29 
In addition, some secondary issues related to legalization 
are of special concern to labor advocates. For instance, some 
legislative proposals would deny legalized workers the ability 
to recapture Social Security earnings they may have accrued 
while working under a false name or number—earnings that 
employers have already forwarded to the Social Security Ad-
ministration (SSA).30 These sums account for billions of un-
claimed dollars in the SSA suspense account,31 and in the fu-
ture should not be denied to the retired workers who earned 
them.  
Labor law issues for the second group, those workers eligi-
ble to participate in the new temporary worker program, are 
relatively straightforward. Workers who regularize their immi-
gration status and thereby secure employment authorization32 
will generally receive the same protections available to U.S. cit-
izens under federal, state, and local labor and employment law. 
In particular, such workers will have access to full labor and 
employment remedies for workplace violations.33 At present, 
 
 29. A 2007 Senate Bill would have established that all persons resident in 
the United States as of January 1, 2007, were eligible to apply for legalization. 
S. 1639, § 601(b). By contrast, the IRCA, enacted in November 2006, allowed 
only persons resident as of January 1, 1982, to seek legalization. See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1255a(a)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 2006). 
 30. See, e.g., S. Amend. 3985 (Sen. Ensign) to S. 2611, 109th Cong. (2006) 
(bipartisan comprehensive reform bill); cf. Jonathan Blazer & Josh Bernstein, 
Confiscating Contributions, IMMIGR. RTS. UPDATE (Nat’l Immigr. Law Ctr., 
L.A., Cal.) May 10, 2007, at 3, http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/CIR/ 
socialsecurity_confcontrib_2007-05-01_iru.pdf (arguing against the Ensign 
Amendment restrictions on legalized immigrants reclaiming past social securi-
ty earnings). 
 31. See, e.g., 152 CONG. REC. S4739–41 (daily ed. May 18, 2006) (state-
ment of Sen. Ensign). 
 32. See 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12 (2007) (enumerating categories of foreign na-
tionals eligible for employment). 
 33. See Andrew J. Elmore, Egalitarianism and Exclusion: U.S. Guest 
Worker Programs and a Non-Subordination Approach to the Labor-Based Ad-
mission of Nonprofessional Foreign Nationals, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 521, 547–
48 (2007) (noting the applicability of general labor and employment laws to 
most temporary workers under current law, but also indicating that “the effec-
tiveness of these protections is substantially limited by statutory exemptions 
of guest workers and the occupations they work in”). Notwithstanding the 
general applicability of federal and state labor and employment laws to all 
covered workers regardless of immigration status, judicial opinions make 
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undocumented workers are ineligible for reinstatement, and in 
some circumstances back pay34—core remedies under nearly 
every federal or state labor and employment regime.35 
Although the labor law issues may be uncomplicated for 
workers eligible to legalize, there will be a critical role for labor 
advocates in assisting individuals to assess eligibility for legali-
zation and prepare applications if they qualify. In this work, 
the stakes will be high. Individuals who cannot satisfy the eli-
gibility criteria Congress ultimately enacts, but who nonethe-
less apply for legalization, risk exposing themselves to arrest 
and removal.36 To the extent that some persons will be eligible 
only if they obtain a discretionary waiver, for instance, of an old 
deportation order or, perhaps, minor criminal history, submis-
sion of a carefully prepared waiver application will be essential 
to the ability to regularize status.37  
 
plain that remedies for workplace violations are limited when the worker is 
undocumented. For instance, a wrongfully discharged undocumented worker 
will not be ordered reinstated, see, e.g., NLRB v. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers 
Group, Inc., 134 F.3d 50, 57 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that the reinstatement of 
an illegally discharged immigrant worker is mandatory only upon the em-
ployee’s proof of work authorization), and is ineligible for back pay in some cir-
cumstances, see Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 
143–45 (2002). 
 34. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1) (2000) (prohibiting employment of unautho-
rized immigrants, thereby foreclosing reinstatement remedies); Hoffman, 535 
U.S. at 148–49 (holding that back pay is inappropriate where the employee 
tenders false documents for employment and the employer is ignorant of the 
employee’s unauthorized status). 
 35. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2000) (authorizing reinstatement and 
back pay for wrongful discharge in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act), 
invalidated by Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that Congress 
may not “subject unconsenting states to private suits for damages in state 
court” through the FLSA); 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2000) (same, for violation of Na-
tional Labor Relations Act); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-69b(b) (2003) (same, for 
violation of state wage-and-hour laws). 
 36. DHS reserves the right to refer, for removal proceedings, a person who 
makes an affirmative but unsuccessful application for an immigration benefit, 
such as asylum or naturalization. See IRA J. KURZBAN, KURZBAN’S IMMIGRA-
TION LAW SOURCEBOOK 412 (10th ed. 2006). A failed legalization applicant 
would be at similar risk. See, e.g., S. 1639, 110th Cong. § 603(b) (2007) (provid-
ing for the removal of applicants who apply for but are denied legalization). 
 37. In the 2007 Senate bill, for instance, persons with an old removal, de-
portation or exclusion order would have been eligible to legalize only if they 
could obtain a waiver based on proof that “departure from the United States 
would result in extreme hardship to the alien or the alien’s spouse, parent or 
child.” S. 1639, § 601(d)(1)(I). U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
(ICE) estimates that as of September 2007, there were 632,000 persons in the 
United States with an outstanding order of removal—a nontrivial number of 
people. See News Release, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE 
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Whether legalization enables ten million workers to secure 
full labor rights, or fewer than one million workers, will likely 
depend on the precise eligibility criteria enacted by Congress. 
The number will be affected as well by the availability of assis-
tance to the millions of working persons who will seek help in 
evaluating their eligibility and preparing successful applica-
tions. For this reason, the labor movement has a deep interest 
in the details of any legalization program and in securing suffi-
cient federal appropriations to support the massive counseling 
and legal assistance programs that will be required for the in-
tended beneficiaries of any legalization program to realize the 
law’s promise. 
B. TEMPORARY WORKER PROGRAMS 
A significant shortcoming of the Immigration Reform and 
Control Act (IRCA),38 the 1986 legislation that enacted a one-
time amnesty measure, was the absence of any meaningful 
provision to manage future migration. In recent years, the 
United States has admitted well more than one million workers 
annually on temporary employment visas,39 through an alpha-
bet soup of programs40 enacted over many years and often on 
an ad hoc basis. The current array of employment-based visa 
categories do not adequately protect workers in the programs 
nor serve the needs of the national economy. The categories al-
so do not reflect the human reality of economic migration, in 
 
Arrests 15 Illegal Alien Fugitives in Lexington, Neb. (Sept. 13, 2007), http:// 
www.ice.gov/pi/news/newsreleases/articles/070913omaha.htm.  
 38. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99-
603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 39. Precise figures are difficult to calculate because, as Deborah Waller 
Meyers has noted,  
Labor Department certification data reflect the number of workers 
certified (employers do not necessary [sic] hire for all the approved 
slots), State Department data detail visas issued (not all of which are 
used or which may be used in the following fiscal year), and Depart-
ment of Homeland Security (DHS) data reflect admissions, not people 
(an individual may enter the United States multiple times within one 
year and thus account for multiple admissions). 
DEBORAH WALLER MEYERS, INDEP. TASK FORCE ON IMMIGR. AND AMERICA’S 
FUTURE, TEMPORARY WORKER PROGRAMS: A PATCHWORK POLICY RESPONSE 3 
(2006), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/ITFIAF/TFI_12_Meyers 
.pdf. 
 40. Temporary employment visas include the E, H, L, O, P, Q, R, and TN 
visas. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15) (2000 & Supp. V 2007); see also  
Foreignborn.com, Visas for Temporary Workers, http://www.foreignborn.com/ 
visas_imm/other_visas/13temp_workers.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2008). 
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which hundreds of thousands of persons each year risk their 
lives in perilous border crossings to seek opportunity, flee per-
secution, or join a loved one in the United States. Neither lega-
lization of those already present nor ever-higher border fences 
will eliminate this migration. Yet the current debates regard-
ing the creation of new or expanded temporary worker pro-
grams, which would admit more workers while creating incen-
tives for many others to defer a dangerous, illegal entry, have 
been at least as contentious as those concerning legalization of 
the undocumented.41 Labor economists and labor law scholars 
have especially important contributions to make to this debate.  
From a labor rights perspective, the two most important 
elements of any temporary or provisional worker program are 
“portability”—that is, freedom to carry one’s visa to a new em-
ployer—and a path to permanent legal status.42 Under current 
law, it is extremely difficult for many employment-based visa-
holders to change jobs, because immigration status is frequent-
ly conditioned on continued employment by the sponsoring em-
ployer.43 Even where available, the legal process for switching 
employers is cumbersome. As a result, many temporary work-
ers in existing visa programs endure extreme exploitation and 
abuse by their employers rather than forfeiting their immigra-
tion status.  
Yet labor scholars well understand the necessity of a ge-
nuine “right of exit” from an employment relationship, if indi-
vidual liberty is to be preserved. This is the promise of the 
 
 41. See, e.g., June Kronholz, Guest-Worker Proposals Prove Divisive, WALL 
ST. J., Nov. 9, 2005, at A4; Robert Pear, Proposals from Both Sides Fail in 
Immigration Debate, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2007, at A18; supra note 17. 
 42. See, e.g., Elmore, supra note 33, at 562 (“[R]emoving the restrictions 
preventing visa holders from leaving their employment would advance liberty, 
sovereignty, and equality interests.”); id. at 566 (emphasizing the importance 
of the opportunity for temporary workers to adjust status to permanent resi-
dent status). 
 43. This is true for nearly all current temporary worker programs. See, 
e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h) (2007) (providing the regulations governing the H-1B, 
H-2A, and H-2B visa programs and limiting the visa to employment for spon-
soring employer); Arthur N. Read, Learning from the Past: Designing Effective 
Worker Protections for Comprehensive Immigration Reform, 16 TEMP. POL. & 
CIV. RTS. L. REV. 423, 443 (2007) (acknowledging that lack of portability is 
“one of the most severe problems of the existing H-2A and H-2B programs”). 
The exception is the J-1 visa program, available for, inter alia, au pairs and 
international student summer work. See 22 C.F.R. § 62.41 (2007). Notably, 
even the 2007 bipartisan legalization program would have expressly autho-
rized “portability” for legalized workers. See S. 1639, 110th Cong. § 601(m)(3) 
(2007). 
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Thirteenth Amendment, which itself secures a principle far 
older than the Civil War.44 As the Supreme Court has ex-
plained,  
in general the defense against oppressive hours, pay, working condi-
tions, or treatment is the right to change employers. When the master 
can compel and the laborer cannot escape the obligation to go on, 
there is no power below to redress and no incentive above to relieve a 
harsh overlordship or unwholesome conditions of work.45  
Although temporary workers may have the formal option to 
leave exploitative and dangerous jobs, the reality is often that 
one cannot risk the termination of visa status and loss of costly 
investments in travel, visa fees, and other expenses, when work 
authorization is not portable.  
It is true that temporary workers may, as a formal matter, 
quit exploitative work, but as in other employment relation-
ships, the right of exit for a temporary worker will be “mean-
ingless” if an employer may “answer[] the exit threat with overt 
coercion.”46 And of course, the “[r]esulting depression of work-
ing conditions and living standards affects not only the laborer 
under the system, but every other with whom his labor comes 
in competition.”47 Denying portability to temporary workers 
thus confers on employers a dramatic coercive power.48 Pre-
serving a genuine right of exit, by contrast, will be indispensa-
ble in allowing future temporary workers to exercise their 
rights to organize, to their certified wages, to a safe workplace, 
 
 44. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. The conviction that a right to exit em-
ployment is fundamental to personal liberty dates at least to the writings of 
Adam Smith. Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property: A 
Renewed Tradition for New Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237, 1251 (2005) (not-
ing Smith’s argument that “each person’s labor is an intrinsic quantum of per-
sonal property, which she may freely alienate by agreement, provided such 
agreements are bounded by the right of exit”). 
 45. Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 18 (1944); see also James Gray Pope, 
Labor and the Constitution: From Abolition to Deindustrialization, 65 TEX. L. 
REV. 1071, 1104–09 (1987). 
 46. Jedediah Purdy, People as Resources: Recruitment and Reciprocity in 
the Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property, 56 DUKE L.J. 1047, 1070 (2007). 
 47. See Pollock, 322 U.S. at 18; Howard F. Chang, Liberal Ideals and Po-
litical Feasibility: Guest-Worker Programs as Second-Best Policies, 27 N.C. J. 
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 465, 470–71 (2002) (“Freedom to leave an employer and 
to take employment elsewhere would give workers greater power to assert 
their rights . . . and thus prevent abuses . . . .”). 
 48. See Read, supra note 43, at 431 (“[P]ermitting a worker to retain her 
legally-authorized status, only so long as she remains employed by a particu-
lar employer, is inherently a form of compulsory servitude that should be un-
acceptable in this society.”). 
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to be free from unlawful discrimination, and to other legal 
rights.  
Second, in any new program, labor rights advocates have a 
stake in ensuring that temporary workers be given some oppor-
tunity to apply to adjust their status to lawful permanent resi-
dence, and eventually to naturalize. Many foreign workers who 
enter on temporary employment visas will likely establish 
community and family ties in the United States. Some of these 
workers will not return to their country of origin upon the expi-
ration of their visas. In this respect, the 2007 Senate legislation 
was not promising. It contained onerous and unrealistic condi-
tions, including a requirement that temporary workers depart 
after two years, wait one year, then reenter for a second two 
years, depart for another year, and reenter a third time for a 
final two years.49 The legislation lacked any path to perma-
nence for temporary workers.50 
Labor scholars have much to contribute to other aspects of 
the temporary worker debate as well. Current guest worker 
programs depend on various labor market tests defined in im-
migration statutes and regulations. These tests generally at-
tempt to discern a local prevailing wage in a particular sector, 
require an employer to demonstrate its inability to hire U.S. 
workers, and then permit that employer to sponsor foreign na-
tionals at the prevailing wage rate.51 Employers complain that 
the labor certification process is slow and costly. Labor advo-
cates object that the prevailing wage approved by the U.S. De-
partment of Labor frequently bears little relation to actual 
wages in that sector and region, and is rarely enforced in any 
event. In light of the lack of portability in current programs, it 
is not surprising that temporary workers are often unable to 
enforce the certified wages themselves, for fear of discharge 
and loss of status.  
There is an urgent need for fresh ideas from labor market 
experts as to how to calculate and enforce a realistic prevailing 
wage for temporary worker programs that does not undermine 
existing wage structures. If meaningful portability is indeed es-
 
 49. See S. 1639, 110th Cong. tit. IV (2007). 
 50. See id. 
 51. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(i)(b) (2000 & Supp. V 2007) (H-1B 
visa for specialty occupation); id. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a) (H-2A visas for tempo-
rary or seasonal agricultural worker); id. § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(b) (H-2B visa for 
temporary or seasonal nonagricultural worker); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h) (2007) (im-
plementing regulations for all H visas). 
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sential to protecting the labor rights of future temporary work-
ers, then that portability must be reconciled with a prevailing 
wage requirement. Why even bother to calculate the prevailing 
wage for a carpenter in Connecticut, and require a sponsoring 
employer to pay that wage, if the same carpenter is truly free to 
leave his position upon arrival and move to Minneapolis? 
For temporary workers, more than for the other classes of 
immigrant workers considered in this paper, the landscape of 
labor law after Congress enacts immigration reform will de-
pend on the program’s core principles. If a new temporary 
worker program lacks genuine portability, then there is a grave 
risk of replicating the exploitative conditions of the Bracero 
program of the 1940s–1960s,52 which so often typify the current 
guest worker programs today.53 If the new program lacks a 
path to permanence, there can be little doubt that it will even-
tually yield more undocumented workers—those who do not 
depart upon the expiration of their visas. On the other hand, a 
temporary worker program with both portability and a path to 
permanence should allow future workers to exercise the full 
range of labor and employment rights enjoyed by U.S. workers, 
including, critically, the right to exit abusive work environ-
ments. 
C. THE ENDURING UNDOCUMENTED POPULATION 
Even if Congress enacts comprehensive immigration 
reform, including a legalization program and new or expanded 
temporary worker programs, there will be a significant undo-
cumented population.54 Some undocumented workers already 
in the United States will not qualify for legalization because 
they will not satisfy residency requirements, have an old re-
moval order or past criminal history, or have run afoul of some 
 
 52. See Cristina M. Rodriguez, Guest Workers and Integration: Toward a 
Theory of What Immigrants and Americans Owe One Another, 2007 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 219, 274 (noting that widespread violation of contract terms and 
extraordinarily poor working conditions characterized the Bracero program); 
ERNESTO GALARZA, MERCHANTS OF LABOR: THE MEXICAN BRACERO STORY 
183–98 (1964) (noting that the Bracero program was typified by underem-
ployment, extremely low earnings, illegal deductions from wages, poor food, 
substandard housing, and rampant exposure to workplace hazards). 
 53. See, e.g., Read, supra note 43, at 432–41 (providing an overview of the 
H-2B Temporary Non-Agricultural Worker Program and criticisms thereof). 
 54. Id. at 428 (noting that even were comprehensive immigration reform 
enacted, it “is critical to realize that undocumented workers will continue to be 
employed in some workplaces”). 
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other eligibility criteria.55 In addition, foreign nationals who 
are unable to access the channels for legal migration will con-
tinue to enter the country unlawfully. Some persons who enter 
lawfully will fail to obtain visa extensions or adjust to perma-
nent resident status, and thus will overstay their visas. Others 
who enter seeking asylum will be denied relief despite a bona 
fide fear of persecution, or will fail to file timely applications 
because of traumatization or other factors.56 There has been 
almost no discussion of the labor rights of residual and future 
undocumented workers. 
There has, of course, been extensive discussion and numer-
ous legislative proposals to increase immigration enforcement 
against undocumented immigrants at the border, in the inte-
rior, and especially in the workplace. Of special note, in 1986, 
with the support of organized labor and over the opposition of 
Latino, civil rights, and business organizations, Congress pro-
hibited the knowing employment of unauthorized immigrants, 
and established fines and criminal penalties for employers who 
violate this rule.57 The consequences of this “employer sanc-
tions” regime have been catastrophic for the labor rights of im-
migrant and U.S. workers,58 and organized labor has reversed 
its prior support for the approach.59  
Despite these political developments, no mainstream polit-
ical figure has proposed limiting or repealing sanctions, and in 
 
 55. The conditions of a future legalization measure are unknown but are 
likely to include certain conditions. See, e.g., S. 1639, 110th Cong. § 601(b), (d) 
(2007) (conditioning eligibility for legalization on the satisfaction of a dura-
tional residency requirement and denying eligibility to persons with certain 
criminal history). 
 56. Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Ad-
judication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 372–74 (2007) (noting extraordinary asylum 
denial rates by some asylum officers and immigration judges). 
 57. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), Pub. L. No. 99-
603, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.) 
(amending the Immigration and Nationality Act). 
 58. See, e.g., Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 140 
(2002) (denying back pay previously given to an undocumented unauthorized 
immigrant worker because such relief was denied by the IRCA); see also Mi-
chael J. Wishnie, Prohibiting the Employment of Unauthorized Immigrants: 
The Experiment Fails, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193, 205–08, 217 (arguing that 
employer sanctions have failed to deter illegal immigration or to protect U.S. 
workers, but have increased employment discrimination and eroded U.S. wag-
es, and should be abandoned). 
 59. See Press Release, AFL-CIO, Immigration (Feb. 16, 2000), available at 
http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/thisistheaflcio/ecouncil/ec0216200b.cfm (stating 
that immigrant workers should be afforded full employment rights). 
WISHNIE_4fmt 5/24/2008 11:42 AM 
1460 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [92:1446 
 
fact, nearly all serious immigration reform proposals would in-
tensify these penalties, add resources to their enforcement, and 
mandate online verification by employers of the work authori-
zation status of their employees.60 At most, there has been ten-
tative discussion of a partial “Hoffman fix.”61 Such a change 
would restore some back-pay eligibility (but not eligibility for 
reinstatement, which will be precluded so long as the prohibi-
tion on employment of unauthorized workers survives) to an 
undocumented worker fired because of her race or sex, because 
she joined a union organizing drive, or because she complained 
of unsafe conditions or minimum wage violations.62 Even a par-
tial restoration of back pay has not been included in the core 
legislative proposals, however. 
For the undocumented, labor law after legalization appears 
disastrous. Immigration enforcement generally, and in the 
workplace in particular, is likely to increase, and in the current 
debate, continuation of “employer sanctions” is assumed. It is 
true that undocumented workers are statutory employees un-
der nearly all federal and state labor and employment laws,63 
but because of the prohibition on knowing employment of the 
undocumented, reinstatement is not an available remedy for 
wrongful discharge. Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Hoffman Plastics Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB,64 back pay is 
frequently not available either.65 After legalization, then, one 
can expect that undocumented workers will face ever more 
onerous conditions, in ever more isolated circumstances, and 
 
 60. See, e.g., S. 1639, 110th Cong. § 301 (2007) (describing the purposes of 
the Act as including continued prohibition of employing unauthorized immi-
grants, obtaining identifying records of such employees, and increasing penal-
ties for violations). 
 61. María Pabón López, The Place of the Undocumented Worker in the 
United States Legal System After Hoffman Plastics Compounds: An Assess-
ment and Comparison with Argentina’s Legal System, 15 IND. INT’L & COMP. 
L. REV., 301, 332 (2004) (noting California’s legislative attempt to “overcome 
the federal immigration policy’s untoward reach, based on the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the IRCA’s policy in Hoffman”). 
 62. See id. 
 63. See, e.g., Agri Processor Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 514 F.3d 1, 5–6 (D.C. Cir. 
2008) (holding that undocumented workers are NLRA “employees”). 
 64. 535 U.S. 137 (2002). 
 65. See id. at 140. But see Michael J. Wishnie, Emerging Issues for Undoc-
umented Workers, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 497, 509–11 (2004) (noting that 
back pay remains available under state labor and employment law where em-
ployers violate employer sanctions requirements and that other remedies such 
as punitive, compensatory, and statutory damages and attorney’s fees are 
available). 
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that the worst sweatshop employers will have an even deeper 
incentive to prefer such vulnerable workers over lawful U.S. 
workers, regardless of the possible civil penalty they may face. 
The labor movement has a powerful interest in ensuring that 
this scenario does not arise. 
  CONCLUSION   
In these early years of the twenty-first century, the na-
tion’s immigration laws play a significant role in regulating 
domestic labor markets. They also define and limit labor rights 
for millions of low-wage immigrant workers, often distorting 
the labor and employment schemes through which Congress in-
tended to supply basic workplace protections for all workers. 
This corrosion undeniably affects U.S. workers as well, worsen-
ing the terms and conditions of their employment. New legali-
zation and temporary worker programs could bring millions of 
workers into mainstream workplace law. As the immigration 
debate unfolds in Congress, the media, and the public, labor 
advocates and scholars have critical insights and expertise to 
contribute. It is hard to imagine a positive outcome for low-
wage workers without labor’s sustained engagement in the de-
tails of these proposals and unyielding insistence for funda-
mental worker protections. 
